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  This	   paper	   proposes	   a	   genealogy	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   merit	   wants	   coined	   by	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave	   in	  his	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance	   (1959).	  The	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  complement	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  goods.	   I	   suggest	   that	   Musgrave	   invented	   the	   concept	   to	   apprehend	   some	  considerations	  that	  have	  been	  left	  out	   in	  the	  process	  of	  consolidation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  good.	  The	  narrow	  definition	  of	  the	  latter	  could	  not	  account	  for	   important	   state	   responsibilities	   that	   have	   been	   asserted	   by	   many	  economists.	  I	   attempt	   to	   reconstruct	   Musgrave’s	   intellectual	   background.	   First,	   I	   select	  examples	   of	   arguments	   for	   state	   intervention	   from	   authors	   influential	   in	  Musgrave’s	  formative	  period	  (J.S.	  Mill,	  H.	  Sidgwick,	  E.	  Sax,	  H.	  Ritschl,	  G.	  Cassel,	  A.	  Wagner).	   Second,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   invention	   of	   the	   concept	   in	   the	   1950s	  reflected	   contemporary	   concerns	   for	   redistributive	   policies.	   I	   show	   that	  critics	   of	   the	   New	   Welfare	   approach	   (G.	   Colm,	   A.	   Hansen,	   W.	   Heller,	   H.	  Bowen)	   have	   held	   similar	   views,	   which	   were	   also	   in	   line	   with	   the	   liberal	  policy	  spirit	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑war	  era	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Keywords:	  merit	  wants,	  merit	  goods,	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave,	  social	  wants,	  public	  goods.	  JEL	  Codes:	  B29,	  B31,	  H40,	  H42	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Introduction	  In	  his	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance,	  Musgrave	  (1959)	  invented	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  to	  describe	   a	   type	   of	   public	   wants	   which	   are	   satisfied	   by	   goods	   provided	   by	   the	  government,	   although	   they	   could	   technically	   be	   provided	   by	   the	  market	   because	   they	  are	  subject	   to	  exclusion.	   In	  a	  previously	  published	  short	  exposition	  of	   the	  argument	  of	  his	  Theory,	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave	  (1957a)	  mentioned	  transfers	  in	  kind,	  like	  free	  hospitals	  for	   the	   poor,	   and	   subsidised	   low	   cost	   housing	   as	   examples	   of	   goods	   and	   services	  satisfying	  merit	   wants.	   Further	   examples	   of	   what	  will	   later	   be	   called	  merit	   goods	   are	  elementary	   education,	   museums,	   public	   parks,	   etc.2	   From	   the	   beginning,	   Musgrave	  acknowledged	   that	   in	   such	   cases,	   contrary	   to	   cases	   of	   social	   goods,	   the	   aim	   of	  government	  policy	  was	  to	  interfere	  with	  individual	  preferences:	  
A	  different	  type	  of	  intervention	  occurs	  where	  public	  policy	  aims	  at	  an	  allocation	  of	  resources	  
which	   deviates	   from	   that	   reflected	   by	   consumer	   sovereignty.	   In	   other	   words,	   wants	   are	  
satisfied	  that	  could	  be	  serviced	  through	  the	  market	  but	  are	  not,	  since	  consumers	  choose	  to	  
spend	  their	  money	  on	  other	  things.	  The	  reason	  for	  budgetary	  action	  in	  this	  case	  is	  not	  to	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  technical	  difficulties	  that	  arise	  because	  certain	  services	  are	  consumed	  in	  equal	  
amounts	  by	  all.	  Separate	  amounts	  of	  individual	  consumption	  are	  possible.	  The	  reason,	  then,	  
for	  budgetary	  action	  is	  to	  correct	  individual	  choice.	  (Musgrave	  1959,	  9)	  The	   idea	   that	   some	   public	   goods	   should	   be	   provided	   in	   violation	   of	   the	   consumer’s	  sovereignty	   was	   deemed	   unacceptable	   in	   a	   modern	   economic	   theory	   based	   on	   an	  individualistic	  methodological	  principle.	  The	  New	  Welfare	  Economics	  which	  formed	  the	  normative	   basis	   for	   the	   new	   American	   public	   finance	   would	   solely	   allow	   collective	  choices	  aggregated	  from	  subjective	  evaluations.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  concept	  was	  rejected	  by	  Buchanan	   (1960)	   and	  McLure	   (1968),	   among	  others.	   Charles	  E.	  McLure,	   a	  former	   PhD	   student	   of	   Musgrave	   at	   Princeton	   (1966),	   stated	   his	   view	   very	   clearly:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  a	  list	  of	  all	  the	  examples	  of	  merit	  goods	  given	  by	  Musgrave	  over	  the	  years,	  see	  Ver	  Eecke	  (2013,	  36	  n.	  4).	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“There	  can	  thus	  be	  no	  conclusion	  except	  that	  merit	  wants,	  while	  they	  may	  exist,	  have	  no	  
place	  in	  Musgrave’s	  normative	  system”	  (McLure	  1968,	  483).	  
Unlike	  the	  concept	  of	  collective	  consumption	  good	  (Samuelson	  1954;	  Samuelson	  1955),	  or	  that	  of	  social	  good	  (Musgrave	  1959;	  Musgrave	  1969),	  which	  were	  readily	  integrated	  into	  mainstream	  public	   finance	  –	  out	  of	  which	  grew	  public	  economics	  –	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  want	  has	  enjoyed	  a	   thorny	  history	  since	   it	  was	  coined	  more	   than	  50	  years	  ago.3	  	  
In	  this	  paper,	  I	  address	  the	  following	  question:	  Why	  did	  Musgrave	  invent	  this	  concept?	  My	   answer	   is	   constructed	   around	   the	   ensuing	   theses:	   (i)	   There	   has	   been	   an	  impoverishment	   of	   the	   conceptual	   field	   of	   discussion	   on	   the	   theory	   of	   public	  expenditures	  in	  the	  process	  of	  consolidation	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  pure	  public	  goods.4	  This	  impoverishment	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  restriction	  in	  terms	  of	  methodology	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  values.	  I	  suggest	  that	  (ii)	  the	  definition	  of	  pure	  public	  goods	  which	  emerges	  in	  the	  1950s	  is	  unsatisfactory	   for	  Musgrave.	  Therefore,	  he	   invents	  another	  concept—merit	  wants—which	  is	  complementary	  to	  the	  social	  wants	  (later	  social	  goods	  or	  public	  goods)	  concept	  in	  his	  Theory.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  Musgrave	  did	  not	  identify	  a	  precise	  explanation	  of	  what	  triggered	  him	  to	  invent	  the	  concept.	  Thus,	  to	  support	  my	  claim,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  make	  sense	  of	   the	   concept	   in	   the	   context	   of	   his	  Theory,	   relying	  on	   stated	   intellectual	   influences	  of	  past	  authors	  and	  contemporary	  colleagues.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  different	  uses	  and	  justifications	  of	  the	  concept	  provided	  by	  Musgrave	  over	  the	  decades,	  See	  Andel	  (1984)	  and	  Ver	  Eecke	  (2007).	  The	  latter	  is	  an	  Anthology	  which	  also	  contains	  the	  major	  secondary	  sources	  on	  the	  debate	  from	  the	  1960s	  onwards.	  4On	  Musgrave’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  standard	  definition	  of	  public	  goods,	  see	  Desmarais-­‐‑Tremblay	  (2015).	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In	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  also	  describe	  the	  context	  of	  Musgrave’s	  early	  writings	  on	   public	   expenditures.	   Then,	   I	   explain	   the	   complementarity	   between	   the	   concepts	   of	  merit	   goods	   and	   social	   (or	   collective)	   goods.	   In	   the	   second	   section,	   I	   review	   some	  arguments	  for	  government	  intervention	  that	  could	  be	  labelled	  as	  merit	  wants	  arguments	  and	  that	  have	  been	  proposed	  before	  Musgrave	  invented	  the	  term.	  I	  select	  some	  authors	  that	  have	  been	  influential	  on	  Musgrave’s	  formative	  period.5	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	   Musgrave’s	   approach	   to	   public	   expenditures	   tried	   to	   accommodate	   the	  contemporary	  critique	  of	  his	  colleague	  and	   friend	  G.	  Colm.	   I	   then	  explain	  how	  the	  war	  planning	   experience	   and	   the	   policy	   challenges	   of	   the	   post-­‐‑war	   era	   (full	   employment,	  growth	  and	  concern	  for	  the	  poor)	  brought	  new	  considerations	   for	  public	  expenditures	  that	  were	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  1930s	  when	  Musgrave	  wrote	  his	  dissertation.	  Yet,	  many	  of	  the	  proposed	  transfers	  in	  kind	  will	  not	  fit	  the	  pure	  collective	  good	  definition.	  Another	  concept	  was	  thus	  required.	  
1.	  Musgrave	  and	  the	  complementarity	  between	  social	  and	  merit	  
wants	  
1.1.	  The	  context	  Richard	  Abel	  Musgrave	  was	  born	  in	  Königstein,	  north	  of	  Frankfurt	  in	  1910	  from	  a	  family	  of	   liberal	   intellectuals	   (Sinn	   2009).	   He	   studied	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Munich	   and	   in	  Heidelberg	   where	   he	   attended	   courses	   by	   Adolf	   Weber,	   Otto	   von	   Zwiedineck,	   Alfred	  Weber	   (the	   brother	   of	   Max),	   Jakob	   Marschak,	   and	   Otto	   Pfleiderer	   (Musgrave	   1983;	  Musgrave	  1997;	  Sinn	  2009;	  Sturn	  2010).	  Later,	  he	  received	  a	  scholarship	  which	  allowed	  him	  to	  go	  to	  Rochester	  (NY)	  in	  1933.	  With	  the	  turn	  of	  events	  in	  Germany,	  he	  decided	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Other	  thinkers	  have	  put	  forward	  arguments	  for	  state	  intervention	  that	  are	  close	  to	  Musgrave’s	  arguments	  for	  merit	  goods,	  but	  they	  probably	  did	  not	  influence	  him	  directly.	  For	  the	  family	  resemblance	  with	  Hegel	  and	  Adam	  Smith,	  see,	  respectively,	  Ver	  Eecke	  (2008)	  and	  Ver	  Eecke	  (2003).	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stay	   in	   the	   US,	   moving	   to	   Harvard	   the	   next	   year	   (Colander	   and	   Landreth	   1996).	   He	  obtained	  a	  MA	  in	  Economics	  from	  that	  university	  in	  1936	  and	  a	  PhD	  in	  1937.	  
In	  order	   to	  understand	   the	   invention	  of	   the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants,	  one	  must	  unravel	  Musgrave’s	  vision	  of	  the	  public	  economy.	  Although	  the	  latter	  is	  best	  represented	  in	  his	  1959	   book	  The	   Theory	   of	   public	   finance,	   one	   can	   get	   very	   good	   evidence	   of	   his	   long-­‐‑sustained	   view	   from	   his	   1937	   PhD	   dissertation	   which	   was	   prepared	   under	   the	  supervision	   of	   Harold	   Hitchings	   Burbank.	   Musgrave	   often	   remarked	   that	   his	  ‘comparative	   advantage’	   in	   the	   US	   was	   the	   knowledge	   of	   continental	   public	   finance	  literature	  that	  he	  acquired	  in	  his	  Heidelberg	  years	  and	  which	  allowed	  him	  to	  produce	  a	  synthesis	   (Musgrave	   1986;	  Musgrave	   1997;	   Sturn	   2010).	   He	  was	   not	   a	  mathematical	  economist	   (Musgrave	   1959	   p.	   ix).	   His	   dissertation,	   and	  more	   generally	   his	   theoretical	  approach	   to	   public	   finance	   had	   more	   to	   do	   with	   the	   German	   “tendency	   to	   classify”	  (Musgrave	   1997)	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   weberian	   ideal	   types	   than	   Samuelson’s	  mathematization	  agenda	  (Pickhardt	  2006).6	  Somehow,	  Musgrave	  was	  more	  in	  tone	  with	  the	   pragmatic	   American	   tradition	   in	   public	   finance.	   Moreover,	   he	   held	   on	   to	   a	  methodologically	  pluralistic	  perspective	  which	  combined	  insights	  from	  law,	  philosophy,	  sociology,	  and	  history	  in	  addition	  to	  neoclassical	  and	  Keynesian	  economics.	  The	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  perfectly	  illustrates	  this	  diversity	  of	  modes	  of	  thinking,	  though	  it	  created	  room	  for	  inconsistency	  criticisms,	  namely	  by	  Buchanan	  (1960).	  
	  
When	  Musgrave	  arrived	  at	  Harvard	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  New	  Deal,	  public	  policy	  was	  a	  hot	  concern	   for	   economists	   and	   politicians	   were	   demanding	   practical	   advice	   from	   them	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6On	  Musgrave’s	  use	  of	  ideal	  types,	  see	  Desmarais-­‐‑Tremblay	  (2014).	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(Musgrave	   1997,	   65).	   The	   rapid	   increase	   in	   public	   expenditures	   attracted	   new	  theoretical	   scrutiny.	   Accordingly,	   Musgrave	   (1937)	   justifies	   his	   dissertation	   in	   those	  terms:	  
While	   the	   limitations	   discussed	   [public	   finance	   focussing	   only	   on	   taxation	   issues]	   were	  
permissable	   [sic]	   in	   a	   period	   where	   Public	   Economy	   occupied	   but	   a	   minor	   part	   in	   the	  
economy	   at	   large,	   the	   expansion	   of	   modern	   Public	   Economy	   renders	   imperative	   1)	   the	  
inclusion	   of	   public	   expenditures	   in	   the	   analysis	   and	   2)	   the	   consideration	   of	   the	   revenue-­‐
expenditure	   process	   of	   Public	   Economy	   in	   its	   inter-­‐relationship	   with	   a	   dynamic	   national	  
Economy	  as	  part	  of	  which	  it	  operates.	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  20-­‐21)7	  Rejecting	   both	   the	   purely	   subjective	   perspective	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   German	   organic	  approach,	  Musgrave	  (1937)	  proposed	  a	  hybrid	  view	  of	  the	  National	  Economy	  combining	  a	   market	   sphere	   and	   a	   planned	   public	   sphere.	   This	   perspective	   is	   similar	   to	   many	  contemporary	   ‘third	   way’	   views,	   rejecting	   both	   free-­‐‑market	   economics,	   and	   total	  socialism.	  The	  state	  is	  conceived	  as	  a	  planned	  household	  in	  a	  world	  of	  market	  economy	  with	   interactions	   between	   the	   two	   spheres,	   each	   one	   having	   its	   own	   rationale.	  Musgrave’s	  project	  is	  revealed	  clearly	  in	  the	  preface	  to	  his	  Theory:	  
Unlike	   some	   economic	   purists	   of	   today,	   I	   admit	   to	  more	   than	   only	   a	   scientific	  motivation;	  
intelligent	  and	  civilized	  conduct	  of	  government	  and	  the	  delineation	  of	  its	  responsibilities	  are	  
at	  the	  heart	  of	  democracy.	  Indeed,	  the	  conduct	  of	  government	  is	  the	  testing	  ground	  of	  social	  
ethics	  and	  civilized	   living.	   […]	   [M]y	   interest	   in	   the	   field	  has	  been	  motivated	  by	  a	  search	   for	  
the	  good	  society,	  no	  less	  than	  by	  scientific	  curiosity	  (Musgrave	  1959	  p.	  v).8	  Upon	  graduation,	  Musgrave	  was	  appointed	   instructor	  at	  Harvard	  where	  he	  shared	   the	  public	  finance	  courses	  with	  Burbank	  until	  1941	  when	  he	  was	  recruited	  by	  the	  research	  department	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  (Musgrave	  1997;	  Smith	  and	  Culbertson	  1974;	  Sinn	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7A	  similar	  ambition	  to	  take	  into	  account	  public	  expenditures	  is	  found	  in	  the	  contemporary	  works	  of	  De	  Viti	  de	  Marco	  (1934)	  and	  Colm	  (1936).	  8	  A	  “philosophy	  of	  life”	  which	  “remained	  intact”	  over	  the	  years	  (Musgrave	  1986,	  104;	  Musgrave	  1999).	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2009).	  There,	  he	  spent	  six	  years	  mostly	  in	  the	  fiscal	  affairs	  section,	  eventually	  becoming	  assistant	   to	   the	   Chairman	   Marriner	   Eccles.	   Reflecting	   on	   his	   Washington	   experience,	  Musgrave	  would	  later	  write:	  “Learning	  to	  understand	  how	  government	  functions,	  what	  data	  sources	  are	  available	  and	  where	  to	  turn	  for	  information	  proved	  invaluable,	  not	  only	  while	  on	  the	  spot	  but	  also	  for	  my	  later	  work”	  (Musgrave	  1997,	  68).	  Eventually	  he	  missed	  academia	   and	   went	   back	   to	   research	   and	   teaching	   at	   Swarthmore	   College	   in	   1947,	  moving	  to	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  in	  1948	  where	  he	  “resumed	  the	  problems	  of	  [his]	  thesis	   and	   formulate	   [his]	   ideas	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   public	   sector”	   (Musgrave	   1986	  p.	  ix),	   leading	   to	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   Theory	   of	   Public	   Finance	   in	   1959.9	  	  
1.2.	  Merit	  wants	  and	  social	  wants	  The	  marginalist	  revolution	  served	  as	  a	  springboard	  for	  new	  reflections	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  needs	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  a	  theory	  of	  demand	  for	  goods.	  Pantaleoni	  (1883)	  and	  Emil	  Sax	  (1887)	  drew	  inspirations	  from	  this	  theoretical	  apparatus	  and	  tried	  to	  explain	  public	   goods	   provision	   by	   analogy	  with	   the	  market,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   trying	   to	  make	  room	  for	  the	  obvious	  fact	  of	  state	  coercion.	  Parallel	  to	  that,	  the	  German	  tradition	  of	  
Finanzwissenschaft	  had	  developed	  a	  profound	  reflection	  on	  the	  goals	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  modern	  state,	  including	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  services.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  wide-­‐‑ranging	  and	  pluralistic	  discussions,	  the	  concept	  of	  (pure)	  collective	  goods	  defined	  by	  Samuelson	   (1954)	  as	  goods	   for	  which	   the	   total	   sum	  of	  quantity	  consumed	  by	  all	   is	  equal	   to	   the	   quantity	   consumed	   by	   each—is	   quite	   narrow.	   Musgrave’s	   conception	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9In	  1958,	  Musgrave	  moved	  to	  Johns	  Hopkins,	  then	  to	  Princeton	  in	  1962,	  and	  back	  to	  Harvard	  in	  1965	  with	  a	  joint	  appointment	  in	  the	  Economics	  Department	  and	  the	  Law	  Faculty.	  After	  retiring	  in	  1981,	  he	  became	  adjunct	  professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California	  (Santa	  Cruz)	  where	  his	  wife,	  Peggy	  B.	  Musgrave,	  was	  teaching.	  He	  passed	  away	  in	  2007	  (Musgrave	  1986;	  Sinn	  2009).	  See	  also	  “Cumulative	  Bio-­‐‑bibliography”	  dated	  from	  1992	  in	  the	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave	  Papers	  (thereafter	  RAM	  Papers),	  Princeton	  University	  Library,	  Box	  7,	  folder	  ‘Biographical’.	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(pure)	  social	  goods	  which	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  non-­‐‑rival	  and	  non-­‐‑excludable	  is	  also	  very	  narrow.	  The	  definition	  provided	  by	   Samuelson	   turned	  out	   to	  be	   very	   fruitful.	   It	   had	   a	  significant	  impact	  on	  economic	  analysis	  as	  judged	  by	  the	  number	  of	  papers	  and	  books	  in	  public	  economics	  which	  have	  been	  written	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  As	  long	  as	  this	  definition	  is	  used	  as	  a	  normative	  assessment	  of	  what	  the	  state	  ought	  to	  be	  doing,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  quite	  many	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  the	  state	  from	  the	  category	  precludes	  them	  from	  being	  justified.10	  But	  even	  if	  such	  merit	  good	  provision	  outwardly	  does	   not	   respect	   the	   methodological	   principle	   of	   popular	   demand,	   they	   are	   deemed	  reasonable	  by	  Musgrave	  (1959).	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  good,	  or	  that	  of	  collective	  good	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  apprehend	  the	  diverse	  nature	  of	  state	  activities	  in	  terms	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  provision.	  
The	   concept	   of	   pure	   collective	   good	   represents	   a	   reduction	   of	   the	   conceptual	   field	   of	  discussion	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  value	  and	  methodology.11	  The	  latter	  is	  quite	  obvious.	  Many	  types	   of	   intervention	   do	   not	   fit	   the	   mathematical	   definition,12	   nor	   the	   underlying	  welfarist	  framework	  of	  individuals	  with	  a	  given	  utility	  schedule	  as	  refined	  by	  Samuelson	  (1947).	   As	   for	   the	   values,	   it	   is	   also	   clear	   that	   public	   goods	   are	   provided	   in	   order	   to	  prevent	  potential	   inefficiencies	  which	  would	  be	  caused	  by	  market	   failure.	  Efficiency	   is	  thus	   the	   only	   normative	   criterion	   taken	   into	   account	   for	   public	   goods	   provision.	   In	  Musgrave’s	   three-­‐‑branch	  model,	   social	  goods	  are	  provided	  by	   the	  allocation	  branch	  as	  much	   as	   possible	   according	   to	   benefits,	   leaving	   the	   redistribution	   of	   income	   to	   the	  distribution	   branch.	   Other	   values,	   or	   normative	   criteria,	   such	   as	   equality,	   patriotism,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10Hammond	  (2015)	  downplays	  this	  normative	  interpretation	  of	  Samuelson’s	  model,	  instead	  putting	  emphasis	  on	  Samuelson’s	  own	  ‘nihilistic’	  interpretation.	  11	  For	  a	  more	  general	  discussion	  of	  the	  narrowing	  perspective	  of	  economic	  thinking	  in	  the	  market	  failure	  tradition	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  see	  Marciano	  and	  Medema	  (2015).	  	  	  12For	  collective	  good	  𝑗	  and	  agent	  𝑖	  and	  quantities	  X,	  X% = 𝑋%(	  ∀𝑖.	  
	   9	  
glory,	   charity,	   etc.	   are	  not	   supposed	   to	  be	   relevant	   for	   the	   allocation	  of	   pure	   social	   or	  collective	  goods.	  
To	  analyse	  the	  corpus	  of	  economic	  texts	  that	  have	  influenced	  Musgrave	  in	  his	  formative	  years,	  I	  propose	  a	  grid	  that	  I	  construct	  on	  Colm	  (1936a).	  A	  fellow	  German	  émigré	  of	  Nazi	  Germany,	  Colm	  was	  a	  prominent	  specialist	  of	  public	  finance	  involved	  in	  public	  policy	  in	  America.13	  
In	  a	  short	  paper	  published	  in	  1936,	  Colm	  reviewed	  and	  criticised	  the	  recent	  theories	  of	  public	  expenditures.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  tried	  to	   link	  state	  revenues	  and	  expenditures	  from	   a	   subjectivist	   perspective	   where	   taxes	   are	   voluntary	   payments	   in	   exchange	   for	  demanded	  public	   services.	  Another	   approach	   is	   to	   distinguish	   a	   private	   sphere	  where	  individual	  needs	  are	  satisfied	  and	  a	  public	  sphere	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  collective	  needs.	  Those	   two	   approaches	   are	   often	   combined,	   but	   are	   both	   rejected	   by	   Colm.	  He	   argues	  that	  the	  action	  of	  the	  state	  is	  oriented	  toward	  political	  ends.	  Security,	  administration	  of	  justice	   and	   other	   public	   goods	   serve	   the	   state.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   the	   only	   way	   to	  understand	  which	   goods	   are	   provided	   by	   the	   state	   is	   to	   study	   the	   social	   and	   political	  transformations.	   Building	   on	   this	   typology,	   one	   can	   look	   at	   the	   literature	   on	   the	  specificity	   of	   public	   expenditures.	   Three	   dimensions	   stand	   out	   of	   the	   discussion	   that	  took	   place	   between	   the	   end	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   and	   the	   1930s:	   (1)	   Assuming	   a	  subjective	  valuation	  of	  public	  goods;	  (2)	  Drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  collective	  needs	  and	   individual	   needs;	   (3)	   Explaining	   public	   goods	   in	   terms	   of	   political	   and	   historical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13Born	  in	  1897,	  Gerhard	  Colm	  was	  a	  German	  economist	  who	  emigrated	  to	  the	  US	  in	  1933.	  He	  joined	  the	  University	  in	  Exile	  at	  the	  New	  School	  and	  soon	  became	  an	  important	  figure	  of	  American	  economic	  policy.	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Trade	  Secretary	  in	  1939,	  he	  moved	  to	  the	  Budget	  office	  during	  the	  War	  to	  become	  in	  1946	  a	  senior	  staff	  member	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisors	  to	  the	  president	  Truman.	  From	  1952	  until	  his	  death	  in	  1968,	  he	  was	  the	  chief	  economist	  of	  the	  National	  Planning	  Association.	  (“Dr.	  Gerhard	  Calm,	  an	  Economist	  And	  Government	  Adviser,	  Dead”,	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  December	  27th	  1968.).	  See	  also	  Krohn	  (1987,	  120	  ff).	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phenomena.14	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  modern	  concept	  of	  collective	  good	  or	  social	  good	  owes	  more	   to	   dimensions	   (1)	   and	   (2),	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   merit	   wants	   captures	   more	  dimensions	  (2)	  and	  (3).	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1	  below.	  
In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  second	  set	  of	  dimensions	  (2	  &	  3)	  which	  are	  captured	  by	   the	   concept	  of	  merit	  wants.	  The	   social	  want	  or	   collective	  want	   concept	   is	  interesting	  only	   insofar	  as	   in	   its	   consolidation	  process,	   it	   leaves	  aside	  some	   important	  elements	  that	  are	  picked	  up	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  want.15	  The	  following	  figure	  is	  also	  a	  reminder	  of	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	   terminology	   from	  wants	   to	  goods.	  As	  collective	  wants	  came	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  technical	  characteristics	  (non-­‐‑rivalry,	  non-­‐‑exclusion)	  of	  the	  goods	  which	   satisfy	   them,	   more	   and	   more	   authors	   embraced	   the	   goods	   terminology.16	   This	  substitution	  does	  not	   fit	   the	  merit	  wants	  category	  as	  well.	  The	  latter	   is	  used	  more	  in	  a	  discussion	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   needs	   which	   can	   be	   satisfied	   by	   different	   types	   of	   goods	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14Although	  both	  dimensions	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  present	  in	  De	  Viti	  de	  Marco	  (1934),	  Mazzola	  (1890)	  and	  others,	  they	  do	  not	  need	  to	  coincide.	  For	  instance,	  Walras	  (1896)	  distinguishes	  between	  individual	  needs	  and	  collective	  needs,	  but	  he	  strongly	  rejects	  the	  subjective,	  or	  hedonist,	  evaluation	  of	  public	  goods.	  This	  does	  not	  prevent	  him	  from	  developing	  one	  of	  the	  first	  subjective	  conceptions	  of	  value	  for	  (private)	  commodities.	  15In	  his	  discussion	  on	  new	  foundations	  for	  the	  concept,	  Sturn	  (2015)	  rejects	  the	  ‘residual’	  definition	  of	  merit	  wants.	  This	  seems	  to	  me	  a	  sound	  agenda,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  the	  concept	  was	  coined	  by	  Musgrave,	  it	  most	  likely	  carried	  some	  sort	  of	  residual	  nature	  (Ver	  Eecke	  2007,	  3).	  16I	  do	  not	  discuss	  here	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  market	  failures	  in	  terms	  of	  externalities	  which	  runs	  parallel	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  merit	  goods.	  For	  a	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  externalities,	  see	  Medema	  (2015).	  Public	  goods	  have	  been	  represented	  as	  goods	  that	  are	  simultaneously	  consumed	  by	  many	  agents.	  Moreover,	  many	  other	  types	  of	  impure	  public	  goods	  have	  been	  explained	  by	  various	  schemes	  of	  interdependence	  between	  utility	  functions.	  Yet,	  generally	  merit	  goods	  evade	  the	  utility	  function	  representation.	  They	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  welfarist	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  externality	  has	  taken	  root.	  At	  least	  that	  was	  the	  perspective	  until	  the	  first	  formalisation	  attempts	  in	  the	  1970s	  (on	  which	  see	  Desmarais-­‐‑Tremblay,	  2016).	  For	  instance,	  Culyer	  (1971)	  will	  argue	  that	  merit	  goods	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  special	  type	  of	  externality	  where	  individuals	  cannot	  capture	  the	  potential	  gains	  from	  trade.	  
	   11	  
(Musgrave	  1986,	  39).	  In	  spite	  of	  that,	  I	  will	  use	  here	  interchangeably	  the	  expressions	  of	  merit	  wants	  and	  of	  merit	  goods.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Reading	  grid	  and	  semantic	  evolution	  
Another	   aspect	   of	   the	   pure	   collective	   good	   concept	   is	   the	   assumption	   of	   a	   particular	  understanding	  of	  self-­‐‑interest	  inherent	  to	  the	  free	  riding	  argument.	  Ironically,	  Musgrave	  is	  partly	  responsible	  for	  the	  narrowness	  of	  the	  concept.	  In	  order	  to	  reject	  the	  voluntary	  exchange	  model	  of	  public	  goods,	  he	  picked	  up	  the	  argument	  that	  was	  only	  hinted	  at	  by	  Wicksell	   (1896)	   and	   which	   later	   became	   the	   decisive	   story	   to	   justify	   coercive	   good	  public	  provision.	  What	  Buchanan	  (1964)	  would	  later	  call	  the	  spectre	  of	  the	  free	  rider	  was	  first	   clearly	   stated	   as	   a	   footnote	   argument	   by	   Musgrave	   (1939).	   Thus,	   to	   attack	   the	  voluntary	  exchange	  model,	  which	  he	  deemed	  unrealistic,	  Musgrave	  made	  a	  caricature	  of	  this	   strand	   of	   thought.	   This	   had	   the	   unintended	   consequence	   of	   eventually	   restricting	  the	  public	  goods	  label	  to	  situations	  of	  selfish	  behaviour.	   Indeed,	  Pickhardt	  (2005,	  276)	  remarked	  that	  “during	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  public	  goods	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  purely	  selfish	  motivation	  of	  man	  has	   led	  neoclassical	  economists	   to	  promote	  an	  active	  role	  of	   the	  state	  with	  respect	   to	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods.”	  This,	   in	  turn,	  created	  a	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conceptual	  void	  for	  all	  situations	  where	  individuals	  (in	  collective	  settings)	  act	  in	  other-­‐‑regarding	  ways	  which	  could	  then	  be	  filled	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants.	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  simple	  normative	  story	  of	  the	  Samuelson-­‐‑Musgrave	  collective/social	  goods	   is	   as	   follows:	   public	   provision	   and	   compulsory	   funding	   are	   justified	   by	   the	  technical	   failure	   of	   an	   efficient	   decentralised	   allocation	   of	   such	   goods	   under	   the	  assumption	  of	  selfish	  behaviour.	   It	   is	   in	  contrast	   to	  this	  argument	  that	  one	  has	  to	   look	  for	  strings	  to	  pull	  arguments	  which	  lead	  to	  the	  elusive	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants.17	  
2.	  The	  early	  intellectual	  background	  
2.2.	  	  The	  British	  welfare	  tradition	  	  John	   Stuart	   Mill	   and	   Henry	   Sidgwick	   provided	   enlightening	   discussions	   on	   the	   plural	  functions	  of	  government.	  Both	  authors	  could	  have	  influenced	  Musgrave’s	  view	  on	  public	  expenditures.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   of	   his	   dissertation,	   Musgrave	  (1937)	  reviews	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  ideas	  on	  public	  finance.	  Musgrave	  (1959)	  extensively	  refers	   to	   Mill,	   but	   also	   to	   Sidgwick’s	   Principles	   of	   Political	   Economy.	   Furthermore,	  Sidgwick	  is	  listed	  by	  Musgrave	  (1999,	  29)	  among	  the	  figures	  at	  the	  root	  of	  his	  thinking.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  New	  Welfare	  Economics,	  utilitarian	  thinking	  is	  less	  constraint	  by	  strict	  methodological	   principles	  which	   allowed	   thinkers	   like	  Mill	   and	   Sidgwick	   to	   develop	   a	  broad	   reflection	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   state	   intervention.	   To	   be	   sure,	   social	   welfare	  maximisation	   authorises	   interventions	   that	   would	   not	   be	   considered	   Pareto	  improvements.	   The	   general	   rule	   is	  well	   known:	   “Laisser-­‐‑faire,	   in	   short,	   should	   be	   the	  general	   practice:	   every	   departure	   from	   it,	   unless	   required	   by	   some	   great	   good,	   is	   a	  certain	  evil.”	  (Mill	  1848,	  945).	  Yet,	  Mill	  and	  Sidgwick	  recognise	  two	  types	  of	  exceptions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  On	  the	  complementarity	  between	  the	  concepts	  of	  private,	  merit,	  and	  public	  goods,	  see	  Ver	  Eecke	  (2013,	  48).	  Some	  commentators,	  like	  Andel	  (1969)	  and	  Pulsipher	  (1971),	  have	  criticised	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  separation	  between	  merit	  and	  public	  goods.	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to	  this	  strong	  individualistic	  principle:	  (i)	  When	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  the	  best	  judge	  of	  his	  interest,	   and	   (ii)	   when	   unorganized	   self-­‐‑interested	   behaviour	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   the	  greatest	  social	  welfare	  (Medema	  2009	  Chapter	  2).	  
Mill	  (1848)	  rejects	  the	  benefit	  principle	  in	  public	  finance.	  He	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  quid	  
pro	  quo	  between	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  the	  government	  and	  taxes	  paid	  by	  the	  citizens.	  This	  disconnection	  between	   the	   two	  parts	  of	  public	   finance,	   and	   the	   adherence	   to	   the	  utilitarianism	   principle,	   allowed,	   in	   retrospect,	   greater	   flexibility	   in	   terms	   of	   justified	  government	   interventions	   and	   public	   spending.	   Public	   interventions	   are	   guided	   by	   a	  concept	  of	  public	  interest,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  the	  political	  and	  social	  dimension	  in	  my	  grid	   (see	   figure	  1).	   Mill	   draws	   a	   diverse	   collection	   of	   reasonable	   government	  interventions.	  Those	  relating	  to	  cases	  where	  (i)	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  the	  best	  judge	  of	  his	  interest	   will	   later	   be	   labelled	   as	   merit	   goods	   (Sturn	   2015).	   Education	   is	   the	   most	  important	  case	  discussed	  by	  Mill	  and	  turned	  out	   to	  be	  a	   frequently	  quoted	  example	  of	  merit	  goods.	  In	  a	  voluntary	  system	  where	  the	  end	  is	  not	  valued	  enough,	  the	  individuals	  will	  not	  provide	  sufficient	  means	  to	  reach	  a	  socially	  desirable	  level.	  To	  put	  it	  briefly,	  “the	  uncultivated	  cannot	  be	  competent	  judges	  of	  cultivation”	  (ibid,	  p.	  947).	  
The	  other	   type	   of	   exception	   is	   (ii)	  when	   self-­‐‑interested	   individual	   behaviour	  does	  not	  lead	   to	   the	   general	   good.	  Those	   examples,	   such	   as	   colonisation	  of	   new	   territories	   and	  reduction	  of	  the	  workweek	  are	  collective	  action	  problems	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Olson	  (1965).18	  They	   reflect	   an	   exclusion	   problem	   and	   can	   be	   captured	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   social	   (or	  collective)	  good.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18Blaug	  (1985,	  218)	  claims	  that	  Mill	  provides	  the	  first	  analysis	  of	  a	  public	  good	  problem.	  Musgrave	  (1985)	  states	  that	  it	  is	  a	  case	  of	  free	  riding.	  Tuck	  (2008,	  134)	  disagrees.	  Sturn	  (2015)	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  case	  of	  public	  goods.	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Sidgwick’s	  treatment	  of	  government	  intervention	  is	  in	  continuity	  with	  Mill,	  but	  he	  goes	  further	   than	   his	   predecessor	   and	   has	   a	   more	   broad-­‐‑based	   view	   on	   social	   welfare	  (Backhouse	   2006;	   Medema	   2009,	   Backhouse	   and	   Nishizawa	   2010).	   Sidgwick	  distinguishes	   individualistic	   from	   socialistic	   interventions.	   The	   latter	   are	  complementary	   elements	   of	   a	   social	   organisation	   generally	   based	   on	   self-­‐‑interest	  (Sidgwick	  1897,	  146).	  Among	  the	  exceptions	  to	  the	  laissez-­‐‑faire	  rule	  which	  respect	  the	  individualistic	  principle,	  Sidgwick	  mentions	  drug	  controls–interventions	  which	  will	  later	  be	   labelled	  as	  demerit	  goods.19	   In	   the	  case	  of	  education,	  he	  argues	   that	   the	  community	  has	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  the	  intellectual	  and	  spiritual	  development	  of	  its	  members	  (ibid.,	  p.	  155).	  
He	   claims	   further	   that	   the	   community	   has	   a	   certain	   interest	   in	   a	   set	   of	   cultural	   and	  scientific	   infrastructures	   (public	   libraries,	   museums,	   scientific	   laboratories)	   in	   which	  individuals	  only	  have	  a	  very	  indirect	  and	  distant	  interest.	  In	  these	  cases,	  “the	  benefit	  of	  the	   community	   as	   a	   whole	   may	   be	   taken	   as	   the	   primary	   aim	   of	   the	   intervention	   of	  Government”	   (ibid.,	   p.	  156).	   However,	   since	   the	   community	   does	   not	   have	   a	   special	  ontological	   status	   for	   the	   utilitarians,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   one	   can	   understand	   the	  interest	   of	   the	   community	   as	   the	   interest	   of	   its	   individual	   members.	   Hence,	   if	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	  argument	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  by	  Pigou	  (1932).	  A	  student	  of	  Sidgwick,	  Pigou	  did	  not	  come	  up	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  public	  expenditures	  in	  his	  treatise	  on	  public	  finance	  (Musgrave	  1959),	  but	  in	  his	  Economics	  of	  Welfare,	  he	  discussed	  cases	  where	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  the	  best	  judge	  of	  his	  interest	  and	  where	  the	  government	  might	  have	  a	  correcting	  role.	  Musgrave	  (1937)	  refers	  to	  Pigou	  (1932)	  and	  also	  names	  him	  among	  the	  important	  intellectual	  influences	  (Musgrave	  1999).	  Pigou	  also	  advocated	  a	  leadership	  role	  in	  educating	  poor	  people	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  many	  goods	  which	  are	  unknown	  to	  them,	  like	  education,	  and	  art.	  In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  consumer	  sovereignty,	  Pigou	  claimed	  that	  “The	  art	  of	  spending	  money,	  not	  merely	  among	  the	  poor,	  but	  among	  all	  classes,	  is	  very	  much	  less	  developed	  than	  the	  art	  of	  making	  it.”	  (p.	  754).	  This	  problem	  of	  lack	  of	  information,	  combined	  with	  cases	  of	  irrationality	  discussed	  by	  Pigou	  (myopia	  on	  the	  part	  of	  individuals	  and	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  desires	  and	  satisfaction)	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  main	  approach	  to	  justify	  merit	  goods	  from	  the	  1960s	  onward,	  following	  Head	  (1966).	  See	  also	  Mackscheidt	  (1974),	  Folkers	  (1974)	  and	  Head	  (1988).	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individuals	  in	  their	  private	  capacity	  do	  not	  demand	  enough	  cultural	  goods	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  interest	  as	  members	  of	  a	  community,	  therefore	  it	  is	  a	  case	  where	  individuals	  are	  not	  the	  best	  judge	  of	  their	  interest.20	  
In	  sum,	  utilitarian	  ethics,	  and	  a	  good	  dose	  of	  induction	  mixed	  with	  common	  sense	  would	  allow	   for	  many	   exceptions	   to	   the	   general	   rule	   of	   laisser-­‐‑faire.	   Legitimate	   government	  interventions	  do	  not	  derive	  from	  a	  subjective	  evaluation	  by	  the	  citizens,	  they	  are	  listed	  by	  the	  benevolent	  economist	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  socio-­‐‑historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  community.	  	  
2.2.	  Germanic	  influences	  German	  scholars	  have	  maintained	  a	  long	  intellectual	  tradition	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  state,	  from	  Cameralism	  to	  Finanzwissenschaft.	  All	  national	  strands	  of	  thought	  in	  modern	  public	  finance	  (Italian,	  Swedish,	  British,	  American)	  have	  been	  influenced	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  by	   German	   scholars.	   Among	   them,	   Adolf	   Wagner	   (1835-­‐‑1917),	   stands	   out	   as	   the	  intellectual	   father.	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	  early	  work	  of	  Musgrave	  (1937;	  Musgrave	  1939)	  have	  been	  highly	  influenced	  by	  him	  (Sturn	  2006).	  
What	  is	  common	  to	  the	  German	  tradition	  of	  public	  finance	  is	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	   state.	   Just	   as	   the	   utilitarians,	   it	   allows	   them	   to	   consider	   many	   government	  undertakings	  which	  will	  not	   fit	   the	  narrow	  public	  good	  concept.	  For	   instance,	  Wagner	  admits	   many	   special	   collective	   wants	   such	   as	   religious	   and	   moral	   needs,	   elementary	  instruction,	   assistance	   to	   the	  poor	  people	   and	  public	   festivities	   (Wagner	  1892	  Vol.	   III,	  p.	  279).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20See	  also,	  Sidgwick	  (1883,	  421).	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2.2.1.	  Motivations	  This	  broad	  perspective	  of	  the	  state	  is	  built	  upon	  an	  enlarged	  view	  of	  human	  nature.	  To	  explain	  how	  humans	  satisfy	  their	  needs,	  Wagner	  posits	  five	  different	  motivating	  forces,	  including	   the	   (Kantian)	  moral	   law,	   or	   sense	  of	  duty.	  He	  does	  not	  believe	   that	   this	   last	  motivation	   is	   generally	   at	   play	   in	   everyone,	   yet	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   more	   effective	   in	  collective	   action,	   than	   in	   private	   market	   exchange	   (Wagner	   1886;	   1892	   Book	   I,	  Chapter	  I).	  
Emil	   Sax,	   another	   influential	   figure	   on	  Musgrave,	   also	   admits	   non-­‐‑selfish	  motivations.	  The	   Austrian	   economist	   was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   to	   apply	   the	   marginalist	   framework	   to	  collective	   needs	   and	   hence	   was	   very	   influential	   on	   the	   Italian	   tradition	   (Pica	   2003).	  Musgrave	   (1937;	   1939)	   discusses	   at	   length	   Sax’s	   works,	   written	   in	   German.	   He	   also	  refers	  (1937)	  to	  Italian	  authors,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  give	  them	  much	  attention,	  most	  likely	  because	   he	   could	   not	   read	   the	   Italian	   language.21	   Sax	   (1924)	   differentiates	   between	  three	  types	  of	  motivation:	  egoism,	  altruism,	  and	  mutualism.	  Sax	  is	  very	  clear	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  voluntary	  payment	  of	  tax	  for	  collective	  goods	  requires	  that	  individuals	  act	  in	  a	  non-­‐‑selfish	   way	   (ie.	   altruistic	   or	   mutualistic).	   If	   individuals	   are	   assumed	   to	   act	   in	   a	  mutualistic	   fashion,	   they	   can	  voluntarily	  provide	  goods	  with	   indivisible	  benefits	   (later	  called	   collective	   goods)	   or	   even	   collectively	   promote	   goods	   which	   provide	   divisible	  benefits	  (later	  merit	  goods).22	  At	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  methodological	  spectrum,	  Hans	  Ritschl	   (1931)	   also	   admits	   other-­‐‑regarding	   motivations	   in	   the	   collective	   economy.	  Ritschl,	   who	   is	   considered	   by	   Musgrave	   (1937,	   1997)	   as	   the	   contemporary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21Letter	  from	  Musgrave	  to	  Paolo	  Bosi.	  March	  26,	  1995.	  RAM	  Papers,	  Box	  4,	  “Correspondence”.	  22Sax’s	  (1887,	  1924)	  typologies	  of	  motivations	  and	  of	  collective	  needs	  are	  confusing.	  This	  opinion	  was	  already	  expressed	  by	  Wagner	  (1892,	  168)	  and	  by	  Musgrave	  (1937).	  Neck	  (1989)	  painstakingly	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  it.	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representative	   of	   the	   communal	   approach	   in	   Finanzwissenschaft	   proposes	   an	   organic	  view	  of	  the	  state.	  According	  to	  Ritschl,	  the	  individuals	  acting	  in	  their	  collective	  capacity	  are	  driven	  by	  different	  motivations:	  the	  spirit	  of	  sacrifice,	   loyalty,	  and	  communal	  spirit	  (Ritschl	  1931,	  237).	  
In	   a	   late	   paper	   on	   the	   history	   of	   public	   finance,	   Musgrave	   would	   recognise	   both	   the	  importance	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  trying	  to	  incorporate	  other-­‐‑regarding	  motives	  in	  public	  finance:	  
Communal	   wants	   and	   obligations,	   evidently,	   are	   not	   amenable	   to	   ready	   analysis	   by	   the	  
economist’s	  tools	  as	  are	  public	  goods.	   It	  does	  not	  follow,	  however,	  that	  Finanzwissenschaft	  
was	  mistaken	  in	  raising	  the	  issue	  of	  communal	  concerns,	  and	  of	  motivations	  which	  transcend	  
self-­‐interest.	   Public	   finance	   may	   well	   have	   taken	   too	   narrow	   a	   view	   by	   holding	   that	   self-­‐
interest-­‐based	  action	  is	  all	  there	  is.	  [...]	  Nor	  can	  the	  role	  of	  communal	  concern	  be	  resolved	  in	  
the	  utilitarian	   frame	  by	  allowance	   for	   interpersonal	  utility	   interdependence.	  There	   remains	  
an	  uneasy	  feeling	  that	  something	  is	  missing.	  The	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  [...]	  address	  this	  gap,	  
but	  much	   remains	   to	  be	  done	   to	   resolve	   the	  problem	  of	  communal	  wants	   in	  a	   satisfactory	  
fashion	  (Musgrave	  1996,	  73).23	  	  
2.2.2.	  Wagner’s	  Law	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  defining	  criterion	  The	  reflection	  on	  the	  specificity	  of	  public	  goods	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  was	  likely	  driven	  by	  the	  growing	  phenomenon	  of	  public	  expenditures.	  Wagner’s	  Law	  of	  increasing	  public	  expenditures	  provides	  both	  an	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  issue.24	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  also	  Musgrave	  (1997,	  74).	  24	  In	  his	  own	  words:	  “The	  law	  is	  the	  result	  of	  empirical	  observation	  in	  progressive	  countries,	  at	  least	  in	  our	  Western	  European	  civilization;	  its	  explanation,	  justification	  and	  cause	  is	  the	  pressure	  for	  social	  progress	  and	  the	  resulting	  changes	  in	  the	  relative	  spheres	  of	  private	  and	  public	  economy,	  especially	  compulsory	  public	  economy.”	  (Wagner	  1883,	  8).	  A	  similar	  formulation	  is	  found	  in	  Wagner	  (1892,	  Vol.	  III,	  379)	  and	  translated	  into	  English	  in	  Bullock	  (1920,	  32).	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If	  merit	  goods	  are	  seen	  as	  realistic	  concessions	  complementing	  a	  pure	  theory	  of	  public	  expenditures,	  Wagner’s	  insight,	  or	  a	  similar	  kind	  of	  observation,	  must	  have	  preceded	  the	  construction	   of	   an	   ideal	   typical	   category	   in	   a	   normative	   theory	   such	   as	   Musgrave’s.	  Among	  these	  new	  duties,	  Wagner	  saw	  a	  civilisation	  objective	  for	  the	  state	  (Corado	  and	  Solari	   2010).	   By	   providing	   goods	   and	   services	   which	   would	   establish	   the	   general	  conditions	   of	   human	   flourishing,	   the	   state	   can	   help	   its	   members	   taste	   the	   fruits	   of	  civilisation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  state	  would	  help	  them	  to	  attain	  their	  ends,	  by	  promoting	  their	   physical,	   economic,	  moral,	   intellectual	   and	   religious	   aims	   (Wagner	   1892	  Vol.	   III,	  p.	  369).	  Despite	   that,	  Wagner	  does	  not	   identify	   a	  precise	   criterion	   to	   circumscribe	   the	  responsibilities	  of	   the	  state.	  Beyond	  the	  minimal	  protection	  duties,	   there	   is	  no	  general	  rule	  (ibid.,	  p.	  358).	  There	  is	  a	  growing	  tendency	  to	  spend	  for	  civilian	  programs,	  but	  the	  specifics	   vary	   through	   history	   depending	   on	   the	   social	   and	   political	   evolution	   of	   each	  country.	  
2.2.3.	  Public	  responsibilities	  Among	   the	   new	   welfare	   roles	   is	   the	   guardianship	   responsibility	   toward	   those	   which	  cannot	   do	   the	   best	   for	   themselves,	   namely	   youngsters,	   orphans	   and	   old	   people.	  According	   to	   Wagner,	   the	   children	   need	   elementary	   education,	   and	   experience	   has	  shown	   that	   their	   parents	   do	   not	   always	   take	   the	   best	   decisions	   for	   them	   on	   this	  important	  matter	  which	  justifies	  the	  state	  in	  implementing	  mandatory	  instruction	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  282,	  293).	  
Sax,	  Cassel	  and	  Ritschl	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  even	  if	  some	  wants	  are	  divisible,	  or	  can	  be	  conceptualised	   as	   individual,	   there	   is	   an	   overriding	   collective	   interest	   in	   their	  satisfaction.	  Gustav	  Cassel,	  a	  prominent	  Swedish	  economist	  who	  studied	  under	  Wagner	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and	  was	   part	   of	   the	   economics	   curriculum	   that	  Musgrave	   received	   in	  Germany,	   put	   it	  very	  bluntly:25	  
It	   is	   a	   common	   occurrence	   for	   the	  machinery	   for	   satisfying	   collective	   wants	   to	   extend	   its	  
operations	   to	  wants	  which	  can	  only	  be	  called	  collective	   in	  a	   relative	  sense,	  or	  which	  are	   in	  
themselves	  purely	   individual,	  although	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  them	  has	  also	  a	  certain	  collective	  
interest.	   [...]	  Modern	   social	   policy	   has	   in	   this	  way	   given	   a	   certain	   collective	   character	   to	   a	  
large	  number	  of	  wants.	  We	  have	  only	  to	  think	  of	  the	  numerous	  measures	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  
social	   hygiene,	   such	   as	   free	   or	   cheap	   public	   baths.	   Every	   extension	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   the	  
collective	  satisfaction	  of	  wants	  clearly	  means	  an	  encroachment	  of	  public	  authority	  upon	  the	  
sphere	  of	  individual	  choice,	  for	  certain	  individual	  needs	  are	  held	  to	  be	  particularly	  important,	  
and	  individuals	  in	  the	  aggregate	  are	  compelled	  to	  use	  their	  means	  more	  liberally	  in	  meeting	  
these	   needs	   than	   they	  would	   if	   they	  were	   not	   compelled.	   In	   this	  way	   the	   freedom	  of	   the	  
individual	  to	  regulate	  his	  own	  demand	  for	  goods	  and	  services	  is	  restricted.	  (Cassel	  1919,	  71)	  Just	   like	   Sidgwick	   and	   Sax,	   Cassel	   here	   acknowledges	   cases,	   like	   education,	   where	  individual	   choice	   is	   superseded	   by	   collective	   interest.	   Although	   of	   a	   technically	  individual	   nature,	   the	   community	   has	   given	   a	   collective	   character	   to	   some	   needs.	  Individuals	  in	  the	  aggregate	  are	  therefore	  forced	  to	  consume	  more	  of	  some	  goods	  than	  they	   would	   have	   done	   in	   isolation,	   or	   in	   the	   past.	   Thus,	   coming	   very	   close	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	  merit	  wants,	  Cassel	  also	  recognises	  that	   these	  activities	  represent	  an	  “encroachment	   of	   public	   authority	   upon	   the	   sphere	   of	   individual	   choice”	   (ibid.).	   For	  Ritschl	   (1931),	   the	   essence	  of	   the	  public	   economy	  was	   “a	  matter	  of	   satisfying	  pure	  or	  partaking	  communal	  needs”.	  When	  the	  state	  is	  satisfying	  some	  individual	  needs,	  it	  does	  not	   act	   out	   of	   a	   “technical	   reason”	   (Ritschl	   1931,	   236).	   Rather,	   the	   intervention	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25Cassel	  was	  one	  of	  the	  thinkers	  of	  the	  Swedish	  model	  of	  social-­‐‑democracy	  (Carlson	  2003).	  In	  his	  Theoretische	  Sozialökonomie	  (Theory	  of	  Social	  Economy),	  he	  came	  very	  close	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  two	  musgravian	  criteria	  for	  public	  goods	  (Sturn	  2010).	  Musgrave	  (1983)	  recalls	  that	  he	  attended	  a	  course	  by	  Adolf	  Weber	  in	  Munich	  which	  was	  a	  “watered-­‐‑down”	  version	  of	  Cassel’s	  Theory	  (Colander	  and	  Landreth	  1996,	  195).	  Cassel	  had	  a	  very	  clear	  view	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  and	  its	  relation	  with	  the	  citizens.	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justified	   to	   prevent	   undesirable	   consequences	   of	   leaving	   such	   important	   needs	   to	   be	  satisfied	  by	  market	  allocation	  (ibid.,	  p.	  239).	  
Although	   he	   adopts	   an	   Austrian	   subjectivist	   perspective,	   Sax	   also	   integrates	   some	  communal	   concerns	   in	   his	   analysis	   (Sturn	  2010,	   288).	  He	   takes	   the	   individuals	   as	   the	  subject	   of	   the	   inquiry,	   their	   welfare	   being	   the	   object	   of	   collective	   activity	   (Sax	   1924,	  179).	   Depending	   on	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   collective	   activity	   and	   the	   divisibility	   of	   the	  benefits,	  many	   types	   of	   situations	   can	  occur.	   For	   instance,	   individuals	   can	   aim	   for	   the	  satisfaction	   of	   indivisible	   collective	   needs,	   or	   they	   can	   collectively	   aim	   to	   provide	  benefits	  to	  specific	  members	  of	  the	  community.	  In	  the	  latter,	  it	  can	  be	  the	  case	  that	  “the	  satisfaction	   of	   individual	   needs	   through	   collective	   supply	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   is	   a	  means	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  some	  collective	  purpose”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  180).	  	  
What	  emerges	   from	  this	  brief	  survey	  of	  German-­‐‑writing	  authors	   is	   that	   they	  study	  the	  economic	   functions	   of	   the	   state	   by	   assuming	   that	   individuals	   act	   in	   their	   collective	  capacity,	   and	   often	   in	   a	   non-­‐‑selfish	   way.	   Some	   of	   the	   goods	   provided	   by	   the	   state,	  identified	  through	  a	  socio-­‐‑political	  analysis,	  fulfil	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  community.	  
2.3.	  The	  young	  Musgrave	  Musgrave’s	   dissertation	   (1937)	   is	   already	   an	   attempt	   at	   synthesising	   the	   different	  strands	  of	  thought	  in	  public	  finance	  on	  the	  topics	  of	  expenditures	  and	  taxation.	  Although	  merit	   wants	   do	   not	   appear	   before	   1957,	   it	   is	   worthwhile	   to	   see	   to	   which	   extent	  Musgrave’s	  approach	  to	  public	  economy	  sets	  the	  table	  for	  his	  maturer	  work.	  Even	  if	  he	  does	  not	  come	  up	  with	  a	  typology	  of	  public	  goods	  of	  his	  own	  in	  his	  dissertation,	  one	  can	  try	   to	   identify	   theoretical	  conditions	   for	   the	  possibility	  of	  merit	  wants	   to	  arise.	  Among	  the	   key	   features	   that	  Musgrave	   imported	   are	   “a	   positive	   approach	   to	   the	   expenditure	  side	   of	   the	   budget”	   and	   a	   “concern	   for	   communal	  wants”	   (Musgrave	   1997).	  Musgrave	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follows	   Wagner	   (1883,	   2)	   in	   taking	   the	   state	   as	   the	   subject	   of	   public	   finance.	   This	  methodological	   starting	   point	   allowed	   for	   two	   interesting	   features.	   To	   begin	  with,	   the	  fact	  of	  state	  coercion	  is	  integrated	  at	  the	  outset	  (Musgrave	  1937,	  74).	  This	  is	  essential	  for	  merit	   wants	   to	   arise,	   since	   there	   must	   be	   the	   possibility	   for	   a	   discrepancy	   between	  aggregate	  demand	  for	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  what	  the	  government	  decides	  to	  provide,	  something	  that	  is	  not	  allowed	  in	  the	  voluntary	  exchange	  models	  of	  Lindahl	  (1919)	  and	  the	   likes.	  Moreover,	  Musgrave	   also	   acknowledges	   the	   ethical	   nature	   of	   such	   decisions	  (ibid,	  p.	  80).	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  no	  mechanical	  solution	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  public	  needs.	  In	  a	  democratic	  society,	  decisions	  will	  have	  to	  be	  made	  by	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  people—decisions	  which	  will	  not	  satisfy	  everyone’s	  value	  scale.	  
In	  technical	  terms,	  Musgrave	  assumes	  that	  the	  government	  acts	  on	  a	  given	  social	  value	  scale.	   Just	   like	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	   individuals	   for	   private	   goods,	   the	   economist	  assumes	   that	   the	   social	   value	   scale	   is	   exogenous.	   Again	   following	  Wagner,	   no	   unique	  criterion	   for	   the	   justified	   interventions	  of	   the	   state	   is	   identified.	  Admittedly,	   there	   are	  individual	   wants,	   and	   “social	   wants	   proper”26	   but	   they	   do	   not	   delimit	   the	   boundary	  between	   private	   and	   public	   goods,	   since	   individual	   needs	   can	   be	   satisfied	   by	   public	  services	   if	   the	   government	   decides	   to	   do	   so.	   Musgrave	   cuts	   through	   the	   complicated	  question	  of	  determining	   if	  wants	  are	   felt	  by	   the	   individuals,	  or	  by	   the	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  by	  assuming	  that	  they	  are	  assessed	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  social	  planner	  who	  homogenises	  them.	  Hence	  Musgrave	  recognises	  two	  types	  of	  public	  expenditures:	  those	   aimed	   at	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   social	   wants	   proper,	   and	   those	   aimed	   at	   “socially	  interpreted	  individual	  wants”:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  The	  expression	  of	  “social	  wants	  proper”	  is	  likely	  adapted	  from	  Sax’s	  (1924)	  expression	  of	  “collective	  wants	  proper”	  (eigentlichen	  Kollektivbedürfnisse).	  	  
	   22	  
The	  above	  illustration	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  public	  expenditure	  items,	  aiming	  
at	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   individual	   wants,	   but	   proceeding	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   social,	   rather	   than	  
individual,	  evaluation	  of	  such	  wants.	  Instead	  of	  housing,	  a	  free	  supply	  of	  educational,	  medical	  
or	  sanitary	  services	  could	  have	  been	  chosen	  as	  examples.	  Not	  only	  may	  in	  certain	  instances	  
the	  individual	  evaluation	  of	  such	  services	  be	  below	  the	  social	  one,	  but	  it	  may	  actually	  be	  zero	  
or	  negative.	  (ibid,	  p.	  348)	  This	  is	  the	  closest	  he	  will	  get	  in	  the	  1930s	  to	  what	  will	  become	  in	  1959	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  allocation	  branch,	  namely	  provision	  to	  satisfy	  social	  wants	  and	  merit	  wants.	  
3.	  Contemporary	  influences	  In	  this	  last	  section	  before	  the	  conclusion,	  I	  show	  to	  what	  extent	  Musgrave’s	  invention	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  in	  the	  1950s	  reflects	  concurrent	  concerns	  for	  redistributive	  policies.	  There	  were	   indeed	  contemporary	  voices	   in	  America	  which	  echoed	  arguments	  similar	  to	  those	  advanced	  by	  earlier	  British	  and	  Germanic	  scholars,	  albeit	  in	  a	  different	  context.	   The	   influences	   surveyed	   up	   to	   now	   constituted	   Musgrave’s	   intellectual	  background,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  write	  his	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance	  merely	  to	  argue	  with	  long-­‐‑dead	   scholars.	   First,	   I	   discuss	   Gerhard	   Colm’s	   criticism	   of	   the	   new	   American	   Public	  Finance.	   Colm	   is	   interesting	   as	   a	   contemporary	   and	   American	   representative	   of	   the	  German	  tradition	  of	  public	  finance.	  Second,	  I	  show	  how	  Musgrave’s	  merit	  wants	  address	  political	  challenges	  of	  post-­‐‑war	  America	  which	  were	  shared	  by	  his	  liberal	  institutionalist	  colleagues.	  
3.1.	  Gerhard	  Colm	  When	   Gerhard	   Colm	   (1897-­‐‑1968)	   moved	   to	   the	   US,	   he	   was	   13	   years	   older	   than	  Musgrave.	   His	   economics	   training	   had	   been	   completed	   for	   a	   few	   years	   and	   he	   never	  integrated	   neoclassical	   economics	   into	   his	   applied	   policy	   work	   (Sturn	   2010).	   Colm	  stands	  as	  one	  of	  the	  last	  figure	  of	  public	  finance	  in	  the	  US	  to	  oppose	  the	  individualistic	  approach:	   “I	   think	   it	   does	   not	   make	   sense	   to	   interpret	   a	   person’s	   ideas	   about	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international	  tension,	  national	  security,	  foreign	  aid,	  conservation	  of	  resources,	  education	  and	   health	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   ‘individual	   wants’	   and	   to	   propose	   that	   the	   costs	   for	   these	  programs	  should	  be	  allocated	  accordingly”	  (Colm	  1957,	  54).27	  
Moreover,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  benefit	  approach	  cannot	  be	  strictly	  applied,	  since	  it	  would	  only	  account	  for	  the	  demand	  of	  actual	  citizens.	  Instead,	  the	  state,	  as	  an	  eternal	  entity,	  can	  take	  care	  of	   future	  generations	  (Colm	  1936a,	  6).28	  Rejecting	  any	  normative	  pretension,	  Colm	  claims	  that	  public	  expenses	  satisfy	  political	  aims.	  For	  him,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  purely	  individualistic	  need,	  or	  a	  purely	  collective	  one.	  Education,	  for	  instance,	  is	  both	  an	   individual	   and	   a	   collective	   need	   and	   it	   is	   not	   publicly	   funded	   because	   of	   some	  technical	   reason	   (indivisibility,	   non-­‐‑rivalness,	   or	   non-­‐‑excludability)	   (Colm	   1956,	   411).	  Echoing	  remarks	  which	   I	  highlighted	   in	   the	  two	  previous	  sections,	  Colm	  makes	   it	  very	  clear	  that	  beyond	  the	  cases	  of	  market	  failures,	  for	  some	  important	  issues,	  the	  market	  is	  not	   the	   appropriate	   allocation	   mechanism	   because	   it	   has	   important	   distributional	  consequences:	  
There	   are	   other	   tasks	   assumed	   by	   the	   state	   which	   could	   technically	   be	   fulfilled	   by	   the	  
marketing	  system.	  […]	  If	  the	  state	  for	  political,	  cultural,	  or	  economic	  reasons	  desires	  to	  have	  
a	   certain	   minimum	   standard	   of	   education,	   then	   this	   field	   must	   be	   separated	   from	   the	  
marketing	   mechanism	   and	   shifted	   to	   the	   administrative	   economy.	   Thus	   we	   have	   public	  
education,	   public	   hygiene,	   public	   recreation,	   even	   certain	   attempts	   at	   public	   housing,	  
because	  we	  wish	  to	  avoid	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  marketing	  distribution	  in	  those	  fields.	  (Colm	  
1936a,	  6).	  In	   a	   way,	   Musgrave’s	   invention	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  merit	   good	   is	   partly	   explained	   as	   a	  concession	   to	   the	  persuasive	  critiques	   that	  Colm	  addressed	   to	   the	  benefit	   approach	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  A	  long-­‐‑held	  conviction.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Colm	  (1936b).	  	  28This	  was	  also	  explicitly	  argued	  by	  Wagner	  (1892	  Vol.	  III	  p.	  283)	  and	  by	  Musgrave	  (1937,	  76).	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public	  expenditures,	  and	  also	  more	  generally	  a	  concession	  to	  the	  German	  philosophy	  of	  the	  state	  that	  he	  represented.	  In	  fact,	  Musgrave	  (1937)	  discusses	  and	  criticises	  at	  length	  Colm’s	   (1927)	   habilitation	   thesis	   Volkswirtschaftliche	   Theorie	   der	   Staatsausgaben	  (National	  theory	  of	  public	  expenditures).	  Both	  men	  being	  involved	  in	  public	  policy	  during	  the	   war,	   Musgrave	   (1983,	   93)	   referred	   to	   Colm	   as	   “a	   good	   friend	   and	   colleague	   in	  Washington	   affairs.”29	   In	   a	   section	   on	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   individualistic	   approach,	  Musgrave	  (1959)	  refers	   in	  a	   footnote	   to	   “personal	  discussions”	  with	  Colm.	  At	   the	  very	  least,	  Colm	  was	  among	  the	  few	  economists	  who	  gave	  a	  positive	  reception	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants:	  
The	   introduction	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘merit	   wants’	   indicates	   that	   Musgrave	   recognised	   the	  
limited	   applicability	   of	   consumer	   preferences	   to	   government	   services,	   but	   he	   failed	   in	  
drawing	  the	  full	  consequences	  from	  this	  recognition.	  [...]	  If	  I	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  
wants,	   it	   has	   a	  wider	   application,	   not	   only	   to	   education	   and	  health	   services	  mentioned	  by	  
Musgrave	  (Colm	  1960a,	  119).30	  Colm	   (1960b;	   Colm	   1965)	   argued	   that	   governments	   resorted	   to	   the	   norm	   of	   public	  interest	  to	  conduct	  their	  policy.	  In	  a	  review	  of	  Musgrave	  (1959)’s	  Theory,	  Colm	  (1960a,	  19–20)	  stated:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29They	  likely	  met	  in	  sessions	  of	  the	  Fiscal	  Policy	  Seminar	  at	  Harvard	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  Alvin	  H.	  Hansen	  and	  John	  H.	  Williams.	  (Harvard	  Course	  catalogue,	  Graduate	  School	  of	  Public	  Administration,	  attachment	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  Walter	  Salant	  to	  Richard	  Musgrave.	  January	  1988.	  RAM	  Papers,	  Box	  5.	  Also	  available	  on	  Irwin	  Collier’s	  blog	  [http://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-­‐‑economics-­‐‑hansen-­‐‑and-­‐‑williams-­‐‑fiscal-­‐‑seminar-­‐‑1937-­‐‑1944/].)	  See	  also	  Musgrave’s	  note	  to	  Mr.	  Thurston	  (December	  18,	  1945)	  where	  he	  refers	  to	  a	  recent	  discussion	  with	  Colm.	  (Federal	  Reserve	  Board.	  The	  Marriner	  S.	  Eccles	  Document	  Collection.)	  Moreover,	  the	  Gerhard	  Colm	  Papers	  in	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress	  contain	  a	  dozen	  letters	  from	  or	  to	  Musgrave	  covering	  the	  whole	  1950s	  decade	  (in	  Boxes	  2,	  3,	  4,	  5,	  6,	  and	  24).	  30	  	  In	  a	  first	  reaction	  to	  Musgrave’s	  (1959)	  discussion	  of	  public	  wants,	  Colm	  restated	  his	  opposition	  to	  the	  individualistic	  approach	  to	  public	  expenditures.	  He	  regretted	  that	  Musgrave	  followed	  the	  Samuelsonian	  perspective	  on	  social/collective	  goods,	  but	  insisted	  in	  trying	  to	  reach	  mutual	  understanding	  out	  of	  respect	  and	  admiration	  for	  Musgrave	  and	  Samuelson.	  (Colm	  to	  Musgrave	  (cc.	  to	  Samuelson),	  April	  29,	  1959,	  Gerhard	  Colm	  Papers,	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  Box	  6,	  Folder	  5.)	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I	  believe	  that	  the	  public	  interest	  is	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  more	  operational	  concept	  to	  
be	   used	   in	   a	   theory	   of	   public	   finance.	   It	   includes	   satisfaction	   of	   individual	   needs	   in	   those	  
areas	  where	   government	   services	   are	   designed	   to	  meet	   individual	   needs	  which	   cannot	   be	  
adequately	  met	  by	  the	  market	  mechanism.	  But	  the	  public	  interest	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  criterion	  
for	   the	  satisfaction	  of	   ‘merit’	  wants,	   for	   redistribution,	  and	  promotion	  of	  economic	  growth	  
and	  stability.31	  
3.2.	  Beyond	  full	  employment	  I	   want	   to	   briefly	   discuss	   Musgrave’s	   choice	   of	   words	   for	   the	   concept	   of	  merit	   wants	  which	  appeared	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  (1957a).	  I	  think	  Musgrave	  uses	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  in	  the	  common	  sense	  of	  virtue	  or	  value.	  Not	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  some	  goods	  are	  deserving,	  but	   rather	   that	   people,	   as	   human	   beings,	   or	  members	   of	   a	   community,	   deserve	   some	  amount	  of	  those	  goods.	  
There	   is	   at	   least	   one	   antecedent	   to	   the	   expression	   of	  merit	   want	   in	   a	   book	   chapter	  written	   in	  1945	  while	  Musgrave	  was	  at	   the	  Fed.	  The	  paper	  addresses	   fiscal	  policies	   to	  attain	   full	   employment	   and	   macroeconomic	   stability.	   Musgrave	   claims	   that	   full	  employment	  may	  require	  public	  expenditures,	  but	  that	  the	  specific	  programs	  on	  which	  expenses	   are	   made	   have	   to	   be	   selected	   on	   their	   own	   merit:	   “the	   intrinsic	   merit	   of	  expenditure	   items	   is	   the	   first	   criterion	   of	   choice,	   not	   their	   effect	   on	   employment”	  (Musgrave	  1945,	  8).	  The	  same	  idea	  recurs	  many	  times	  in	  the	  text:	  
There	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  and	  compensatory	  adjustments	  which	  requires	  
public	  expenditures	  that	  are	  not	  warranted	  on	  their	  own	  merits.	   If	  budget	  adjustments	  are	  
needed	   to	   raise	   the	   level	   of	   total	   expenditures,	   public	   expenditures	   may	   be	   increased	   if	  
additional	  public	   services	   are	  desired;	   this	  may	   take	   the	   form	  of	  public	   investment	  outlays	  
such	  as	  public	  construction	  or,	  depending	  on	  social	  needs,	  the	  additional	  expenditures	  may	  
well	  be	  for	  school	  luncheons	  or	  education	  (ibid.,	  p.	  14).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  A	  year	  after	  having	  read	  Musgrave’s	  Theory,	  Colm(1960b)	  published	  a	  paper	  detailing	  his	  view	  of	  the	  public	  interest,	  and	  referred	  to	  Musgrave’s	  idea	  of	  merit	  wants	  in	  a	  footnote.	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In	  preparation	  for	  the	  aforementioned	  essay	  published	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	  the	  Federal	   Reserve,	   Musgrave	   wrote	   a	   longer	   piece	   entitled	   Postwar	   Fiscal	   Policy.32	   He	  explains	   that	   the	   first	   and	   foremost	   challenge	   of	   post-­‐‑war	   fiscal	   policy	   is	   to	   avoid	   a	  contraction	   similar	   to	   the	   one	   experienced	   after	   the	   Great	   War	   when	   military	  expenditures	  were	  cut	  back	  rapidly.	  If	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  not	  ready	  to	  fully	  compensate	  a	   decline	   in	   military	   expenditures,	   which	   seemed	   likely,	   overall	   public	   expenditures	  must	   remain	   high	   to	   guarantee	   full	   employment.	  Musgrave	   argued	   that	   the	   economic	  focus	   on	   reducing	   unemployment	   and	   favouring	   growth	   should	   achieve	   ‘substantial	  agreement’.	  In	  retrospect,	  Musgrave	  was	  right.	  Partially	  because	  of	  its	  political	  neutrality	  with	   respect	   to	   specific	   choices	  about	   the	  good	   life,	   the	  policy	  of	   full	   employment	  and	  growth	   convinced	   democrats	   and	   republicans	   alike	   (Sandel	   1996,	   chap.	   8).	   Yet,	  Musgrave	  goes	   further	   than	   the	  neutral	  policy	  recommendation.	  His	  voice	  has	  a	  moral	  overtone	  representative	  of	  the	  formative	  ambition	  of	  the	  Progressives.33	  He	  does	  not	  shy	  away	   from	   making	   a	   value	   judgement	   on	   the	   type	   of	   social	   needs	   which	   should	   be	  satisfied	  by	  public	  expenditures:	  
There	   are	   large	   areas	   of	   public	   services	   such	   as	   resource	   development,	   public	   health,	  
education,	   and	   housing	   which	   have	   been	   badly	   neglected	   and	   rate	   a	   high	   priority	   in	   the	  
nation’s	  needs.	  They	  will	   stand	  on	  their	  own	  merits;	  other	  projects	  of	  a	  makework	  kind	  do	  
not	  (Musgrave	  1945).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32Unpublished	  and	  undated,	  but	  very	  likely	  from	  1944	  or	  early	  1945.	  46	  pages.	  RAM	  Papers,	  Box	  8,	  Princeton	  University	  Library.	  33Johnson	  (2015,	  21)	  argues	  that	  “the	  institutional	  approach	  did	  not	  eschew	  value	  judgements	  or	  stop	  investigating	  questions	  when	  the	  subject	  veered	  into	  law,	  politics	  or	  sociology”.	  Musgrave	  admired	  Groves	  and	  Hansen	  for	  their	  “positive	  and	  courageous	  approach	  to	  the	  solution	  of	  public	  policy	  problems—the	  kind	  of	  attitude	  which	  expressed	  [their]	  Midwestern	  progressive	  faith	  that	  ultimately	  things	  can	  be	  done	  reasonably”	  (Musgrave,	  Heller,	  and	  Buchanan	  1972,	  66).	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Interestingly,	   theses	  examples	  will	  not	  qualify	  as	  pure	  collective	  (or	  social	  goods),	  and	  will	   later	  be	  labelled	  as	  merit	  goods:	  “Public	  services	  aimed	  at	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  merit	  wants	   include	   such	   items	   as	   publicly	   furnished	   school	   luncheons,	   subsidised	   low-­‐‑cost	  housing,	  and	  free	  education”	  (Musgrave	  1959,	  13).	  
Besides,	  Musgrave	  was	  not	   alone	   in	  defending	   such	   views.	   In	   the	  midst	   of	   the	   Second	  World	  War,	   the	   radical	   democrat	   Stuart	   Chase	   (1942)	   had	   published	   a	   popular	   book	  which	   championed	   increased	   governmental	   expenditures	   to	   guarantee	   minimal	  standards	  of	  welfare	  to	  every	  citizen.	  The	  book	  was	  reviewed	  by	  Musgrave	  who	  summed	  up	  the	  argument:	  
In	  Goals	  for	  America,	  Mr.	  Chase	  shows	  that	  our	  resources	  are	  ample	  to	  assure	  everybody	  a	  respectable	  minimum	  standard,	  covering	  such	  items	  as	  food,	  housing,	  clothing,	  health	  and	  education.	  The	  resources	  are	  adequate,	  moreover,	  to	  leave	  plenty	  of	  leeway	  for	  the	  production	   of	   semi-­‐‑luxuries	   and	   luxuries.	   Considering	   the	   war	   record	   of	   American	  production,	   there	   should	   be	   little	   doubt	   about	   this.	   Everybody	   willing	   to	   assume	   his	  social	  responsibility	  should	  be	  assured	  the	  minimum	  standard	  (Musgrave	  1944,	  381).	  Musgrave	  asserted	  that	  Chase	  was	  oversimplifying	  the	  economic	  arguments,	  but	  he	  also	  believed	   that	   the	   general	   approach	   was	   “essentially	   correct”.	   Musgrave	   never	   quotes	  Chase	   in	   his	   work,	   but	   the	   proximity	   between	   Chase’s	   (1942)	   plea	   and	   Musgrave’s	  comments	   in	   1945	   attest	   that	   the	   argument	   for	   increase	   public	   expenditures	   to	  guarantee	   full	   employment	   and	   to	   fight	   poverty	   was	   a	   common	   view	   of	   many	  economists.	  	  	  
Musgrave’s	   Harvard	   mentor,	   Alvin	   H.	   Hansen,	   also	   shared	   his	   practical	   motivation.	  Hansen,	   who	   trained	   a	   generation	   of	   economists	   who	   became	   influential	   in	   policy	  making,	  was	  also	  drawn	  to	  economics	  by	  his	  desire	  to	  “make	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place”	  (Mehrling	   1997,	   88).	   Although	   Musgrave	   does	   not	   quote	   (first-­‐‑generation)	   American	  institutionalists,	  they	  might	  have	  had	  an	  indirect	  influence	  on	  him	  through	  some	  of	  his	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mentors	  like	  Hansen.34	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  latter	  studied	  under	  Progressives	  Richard	  T.	   Ely	   and	   John	   R.	   Commons	   at	   the	   University	   of	  Wisconsin	   between	   1913	   and	   1916	  (Mehrling	  1997,	  86).35	  
In	   Economic	   Policy	   and	   Full	   Employment,	   Hansen	   (1947)	   advocates	   policies	   aimed	   at	  raising	  the	  level	  of	  consumption.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  transfers	  in	  kind	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  strategies	  to	  secure	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  consumption	  for	  the	  masses	  (though	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  already	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  high	  propensity	  to	  consume).	  Hansen	  writes:	  
Thus,	   by	   means	   of	   minimum-­‐wage	   legislation,	   social	   security,	   public-­‐welfare	   subsidies	   of	  
various	   kinds,	   family-­‐allowance	   systems,	   subsidised	   public	   housing	   for	   low-­‐income	   groups,	  
free	   school	   lunches,	   free	   education,	   free	   highways,	   parks,	   playgrounds,	   public	   library,	   and	  
other	   free	   community	   services,	   the	   consumption	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   partially	   publicly	  
financed	   is	   undergoing	   a	   gradual	   transformation.	   These	   are	   carefully	   considered,	   selective	  
ways	  of	  raising	  the	  level	  of	  consumption.	  (p.	  167)	  Yet,	  similarly	  to	  Musgrave	  and	  to	  Chase,	  Hansen	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  the	  aforementioned	  expenditures	  are	  “intended	  to	  establish	  certain	  minimum	  consumption	  standards	  for	  all	  citizens	   throughout	   the	   nation.	   They	   are	   directed	   specifically	   at	   the	   points	  where	   the	  needs	   are	   greatest.	   Guided	  by	   the	   criteria	   of	   social	   utility	   and	   social	   priorities”	   (ibid.).	  The	   general	   observation	  made	   by	   Hansen	   on	   the	   unfulfilled	  wants	   of	   the	   people	   also	  echoes	  Chase’s	   and	  Musgrave’s	  plea:	   “The	  areas	   in	  which	   the	  United	  State,	   the	   richest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34Moss	  (2005)	  claims	  that	  the	  American	  institutionalist	  bedrock	  was	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  Musgravian	  public	  finance	  and	  explains	  its	  relative	  rapid	  success,	  compared	  to	  Public	  Choice.	  Interestingly,	  Gruchy	  (1972)	  considers	  Colm	  as	  a	  neo-­‐‑institutionalist	  thinker.	  35Hansen	  was	  hired	  by	  Harvard	  in	  1937,	  the	  year	  he	  served	  as	  President	  of	  the	  AEA.	  Musgrave	  left	  Harvard	  for	  the	  Fed	  in	  1941,	  but	  came	  back	  often	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Fiscal	  Policy	  Seminar.	  Even	  before	  returning	  to	  academia,	  Musgrave	  led	  a	  project	  of	  essays	  in	  honour	  of	  Hansen	  (Income,	  Employment	  and	  Public	  Policy.	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  
Alvin	  H.	  Hansen,	  published	  by	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Co.	  in	  1948.)	  Musgrave	  and	  Hansen	  also	  co-­‐‑directed	  a	  Fiscal	  expertise	  mission	  to	  Germany	  in	  1951.	  Musgrave	  (1976)	  titled	  his	  eulogy	  to	  Hansen:	  “Caring	  for	  the	  Real	  Problems.”	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country	  in	  the	  world,	   is	   incredibly	  deficient	  are	  (1)	  health,	  (2)	  nutrition,	  (3)	  education,	  (4)	  housing.”	  (Hansen	  1947,	  167)	  
3.3.	  Consumer	  sovereignty	  should	  not	  hinder	  redistributive	  goals	  The	   public	   interventions	   labelled	   by	   Musgrave	   as	   merit	   goods	   in	   1957	   and	   1959	  certainly	   violated	   the	  principle	   of	   consumers’	   sovereignty,	   but	   they	  were	   in	   tone	  with	  the	  prevailing	  liberal	  policy	  agenda	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	   sixties.	   Even	   before	   Galbraith’s	   (1958)	   celebrated	   essay,	   Bowen	   (1948)	   had	  forcefully	   criticised	   the	   reasonableness	   of	   consumer	   sovereignty	   as	   an	   assumption	   in	  (social-­‐‑)economic	   theory.36	   Drawing	   from	  different	   sources,	   Bowen	   advocates	   a	   social	  economy	   “combining	   planning	   and	   democracy”.	   According	   to	   him,	   without	   further	  assumption	   about	   rationality,	   knowledge,	   and	   the	   social	   situation	  of	   choice,	   consumer	  sovereignty	   is	  an	  empty	  postulate	  which	  does	  not,	  most	  of	   the	   time,	   lead	   to	  maximum	  aggregate	  satisfaction	  (Bowen	  1948,	  215ff).	  In	  his	  own	  words:	  
Traditionally,	  it	  has	  been	  assumed	  almost	  without	  question	  that	  the	  consumer	  will	  select	  the	  
‘right’	  goods,	  and	  that	  there	   is	  no	  appeal	  from	  the	  valuation	  of	   individual	  consumers.	  From	  
this	   assumption	  has	   come	   the	   rather	   general	   belief,	   popular	   especially	   among	  economists,	  
that	  it	  is	  economical	  to	  use	  social	  resources	  to	  produce	  anything	  for	  which	  people	  are	  willing	  
to	  pay	  a	  price—a	  somewhat	  exaggerated	  version	  of	  de	  gustibus	  non	  est	  disputandum	  or	  ‘the	  
consumer	   is	   always	   right.’	   This	   argument	   is	   palpably	   unsound	   because	   it	   completely	  
misrepresents	  the	  position	  of	  the	  individual	  consumer	  as	  a	  free	  agent	  exercising	  independent	  
choices.	  (ibid.,	  p.	  	  215)	  In	   1946,	   the	   Congress	   Joint	   Economic	   Committee	   (JEC)	   was	   established	   by	   the	  Employment	  Act.	  According	  to	  Hansen	  (1957,	  82),	  its	  reports	  and	  Hearings	  were	  part	  of	  a	  great	  economic	  ‘educational	  process’	  which	  also	  included	  the	  Economic	  Report	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36Trained	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Iowa,	  Howard	  Bowen	  published	  a	  paper	  on	  social	  goods	  (1943)	  which	  came	  close	  to	  Musgrave’s	  (1939)	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  Lindahl	  model.	  Bowen	  (1948)	  refers	  to	  Musgrave	  (1939),	  and	  Musgrave	  (1957a;	  Musgrave	  1959)	  refers	  to	  Bowen	  (1948).	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President,	   drafted	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   Economic	   Advisers.	   In	   late	   1957,	   the	   JEC	   held	  Hearings	  on	  Federal	  Expenditure	  Policy	  for	  Economic	  Growth	  and	  Stability.	  Among	  the	  panellists,	   Walter	   W.	   Heller	   presented	   a	   paper	   on	   the	   theory	   of	   public	   expenditures	  which	  adopted	  Musgrave’s	  framework	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  As	  he	  put	  it:	  
The	  Musgrave	  contribution	  provides	  an	   instructive	   illustration	  of	   the	   intellectual	  process	  at	  
work,	  a	  process	  of	  which	  the	  Joint	  Economic	  Committee’s	  hearings	  are	  an	  essential	  part.	  His	  
formulation,	   even	   though	   not	   yet	   published	   in	   definitive	   form,	   has	   already	   clarified	   and	  
stimulated	  thinking	  on	  public	  expenditure	  theory	  (a	  field	  comparatively	  neglected	  in	  favor	  of	  
work	   on	   tax	   theory	   and	   policy)	   and	   has	   provided	   a	   base	   for	   further	   contributions	   to	   the	  
subject	  (Heller	  1957,	  101).	  Heller	   argued	   that	   transfers	   in	   kind	   were	   important	   redistribution	   policies.37	   He	  acknowledged	  that	  what	  Musgrave	  (1957a)	  called	  merit	  wants	  posed	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  new	   welfare	   economics	   and	   conceded	   that	   their	   lying	   outside	   his	   framework	   was	   a	  ‘limitation’	  for	  the	  applicability	  of	  his	  Theory.	  After	  discussing	  the	  case	  of	  free	  vocational	  education,	  he	  concluded:	  
The	  new	  welfare	  economics	  may	  protest	  that	  this	  is	  a	  form	  of	  tyranny	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
voters	  over	  the	  minority,	  that	  each	  individual	  is	  his	  own	  best	  judge	  of	  his	  welfare.	  Since	  the	  
equivalent	   cash	   payment	  would	   have	   been	   spent	   differently,	   it	   is	   said	   to	   be	   a	   violation	   of	  
consumer	   sovereignty.	   [...]	   Seen	   in	   this	   light,	   the	   transfer	   in	   kind	  may	   interfere	  more	  with	  
license	   than	   with	   freedom	   of	   consumer	   choice.	   I	   do	   not	   mean	   to	   dismiss	   the	   “tyranny”	  
argument,	  but	   its	   force	   is	   certainly	   softened	  by	   the	  kind	  of	   consideration	   just	  examined.	   It	  
may	  be	   further	   softened	   if	  we	  accept	   the	  proposition	   that	   the	   responsibility	  of	   the	   voters’	  
representatives	   goes	   beyond	   a	  mere	   recording	  of	   individual	   preferences	   to	   leadership	   and	  
education	  designed	   to	   redirect	   individual	   preferences	   along	   lines	  which	   a	   social	   consensus	  
deems	  more	  constructive.	  (ibid.,	  p.	  	  100)38	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  The	  focus	  on	  redistribution	  of	  some	  specifically	  important	  goods	  (“silver	  bullets”	  to	  fight	  poverty)	  will	  become	  an	  important	  strand	  of	  interpretation	  of	  merit	  goods	  in	  the	  1970s.	  See	  Burrows	  (1977).	  	  38In	  his	  testimonial,	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave	  (1957b,	  111)	  also	  briefly	  mentioned	  the	  problem	  of	  merit	  wants,	  though	  without	  using	  the	  expression.	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3.4.	  The	  liberal	  agenda	  	  Musgrave	   first	  met	  Heller	  at	   the	   latest	   in	  1956,	   in	  a	  meeting	  of	   the	  Fineletter	  group	   in	  Chicago.39	  While	  he	  was	  writing	  his	  Theory,	  Musgrave	  got	   involved	   in	   the	  presidential	  campaign	  of	  Adlai	  E.	   Stevenson	   (who	   lost	   twice	   to	  Eisenhower	   in	  1952	  and	  1956).	  He	  was	   part	   of	   a	   group	   of	   policy	   advisers	   to	   Stevenson	   called	   the	   Fineletter	   group.40	  Stevenson	  espoused	  the	  vision	  of	  an	  increasing	  role	  for	  the	  government	  in	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  people.	  The	  Unites	  States	  has	  just	  become	  the	  richest	  country	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  needed	  to	  share	  this	  wealth,	  something	  the	  markets	  could	  not	  do	  to	  a	  satisfactory	  level.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  new	  liberalism	  was	  not	  for	  the	  government	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  entire	  economy,	  but	   to	   “carry	   out	   some	   of	   our	   common	   purposes,	   for	   realizing	   some	   of	   our	   common	  hopes,	   for	   reaping,	   if	   you	   will,	   some	   of	   the	   fruits	   of	   our	   abundance	   in	   this	   period	   of	  unparalleled	  plenty”	  (Stevenson	  1957).	  
Some	   liberal	   economists	   demanded	   even	  more	   increase	   in	   government	   spending	   than	  most	  of	  their	  democrat	  colleagues.	  Even,	  after	  losing	  the	  1956	  election,	  and	  throughout	  the	   1950s,	   Leon	   Keyserling	   repeated	   his	   call	   for	   more	   federal	   spending,	   both	   for	  “economic	   justice,	   [to]	   improve	   human	   beings”	   and	   to	   “maintain	  maximum	   economic	  growth”.	   A	   former	   chairman	   of	   the	   CEA	   under	   Truman,	   Keyserling	   headed	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisers:	  Walter	  Heller,	  Kermit	  Gordon,	  James	  Tobin,	  Gardner	  Ackley,	  Paul	  Samuelson,	  recorded	  interview	  by	  Joseph	  Pechman,	  August	  1,	  1964,	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  Library	  Oral	  History	  Program.	  40See	  letters,	  Henry	  to	  Musgrave,	  and	  Musgrave	  to	  Henry.	  2005.	  RAM	  Papers,	  folder	  ‘Letters’,	  Box	  5,	  Princeton	  University	  Library.	  The	  group	  of	  some	  40	  men	  organised	  by	  Thomas	  Fineletter	  also	  included	  fellow	  economic	  colleagues	  of	  Musgrave:	  Seymour	  E.	  Harris,	  E.	  Cary	  Brown,	  Stanley	  Surrey,	  Gerhard	  Colm,	  Alvin	  Hansen,	  Paul	  Samuelson,	  John	  K.	  Galbraith,	  and	  Walter	  W.	  Heller.	  (Schlesinger	  and	  Harris	  1957	  p.	  xx)	  Musgrave,	  Colm,	  Heller,	  Surrey,	  and	  Brown	  constituted	  the	  ‘tax	  group’	  in	  the	  larger	  Fineletter	  circle.	  (Memorandum	  from	  Colm	  to	  Heller,	  Musgrave,	  Surrey	  cc.	  Brown,	  September	  21,	  1956,	  Gerhard	  Colm	  Papers,	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  Box	  5,	  Folder	  5.)	  
	   32	  
Conference	   on	   Economic	   Progress,	   a	   think	   thank	   which	   lobbied	   the	   Eisenhower	  administration	  to	  increase	  expenditures:	  “The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  Federal	  Budget	  is	  to	  meet	   those	   basic	   needs	   of	   a	   great	   and	   growing	   people	  which	   cannot	   be	  met	   through	  private	   spending.	   […]	   These	   include	   [for	   the	   1958	   budget]	   such	   items	   as	   natural	  resource	  development;	  housing;	  aid	  to	  education	  and	  public	  health;	  public	  assistance	  to	  the	   aged,	   to	   the	   afflicted,	   and	   to	   other	   dependent;	   and	   manpower	   and	   other	   welfare	  services.”41	  	  
Although	   Stevenson	   lost	   the	   campaign,	   The	   Fineletter	   group	   policy	   discussions	   paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	   liberal	  reforms	  of	   J.	  F.	  Kennedy	  and	  L.	  B.	   Johnson	  in	  the	  1960s.	   In	  fact,	  Walter	   Heller	   was	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   CEA	   under	   Kennedy.	   According	   to	   Bernstein	  (2001,	  138),	  he	  was	  also	   the	   instigator	  of	   the	  national	   strategy	   to	   fight	  poverty	  which	  became	  Johnson’s	  War	  on	  Poverty.	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  the	  idea	  behind	  the	  strategy	  was	  first	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  1964	  Economic	  Report	  of	  the	  President	  in	  a	  chapter	  written	  by	  Robert	  Lampman.	  Also	  trained	  in	  the	  progressive	  spirit	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Wisconsin,	  Lampman	   was	   recruited	   by	   Heller	   to	   join	   the	   CEA	   staff	   in	   1962	   (Bernstein	   2001).	  Interestingly,	  after	  he	  went	  back	  to	  teach	  at	  Wisconsin,	  Lampman	  (1966)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  use	  Musgrave’s	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  in	  print.	  
Johnson’s	  ‘Great	  Society’	  comprised	  the	  provision	  of	  many	  merit	  goods	  such	  as	  housing	  for	  the	  poor,	  education,	  free	  luncheons,	  and	  funding	  for	  the	  arts.	  Musgrave	  who	  was	  part	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Consumption–key	  to	  Full	  Prosperity.	  Toward	  rising	  living	  standards.	  1957.	  Conference	  on	  Economic	  Progress.	  pp.	  35-­‐‑36.	  Keyserling	  hired	  Colm	  on	  the	  CEA.	  In	  1957,	  Keyserling	  participated	  in	  a	  group	  of	  21	  economists	  advising	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  living	  standards,	  which	  also	  included	  K.	  Galbraith,	  S.	  Harris,	  W.	  Heller	  and	  R.	  Musgrave.	  (“High	  Costs	  Made	  issue	  by	  Butler,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  Sep.	  12	  1957,	  p.	  21)	  Keyserling	  represented	  the	  older	  generation	  closer	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  New	  Deal,	  than	  to	  the	  New	  Economics	  of	  the	  1960s.	  On	  the	  historiography	  of	  Liberalism	  in	  the	  1950s,	  see	  Beck	  (1987).	  See	  also	  “Oral	  History	  interview	  with	  Leon	  H.	  Keyserling”,	  Washington,	  DC,	  May	  1971.	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library.	  [https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/keyserl3.htm]	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of	   Johnson’s	   ‘Brain	  Trust’	   shared	   this	   progressive	   vision.	   In	   an	   interview	   for	  US	  News	  and	  World	  Report,	  Musgrave	  argued:	  “For	  a	  country	  that	  is,	  generally	  speaking,	  as	  well	  off	  as	  ours,	  the	  challenge	  of	  economic	  growth	  is	  this:	  What	  do	  you	  do	  with	  your	  wealth?	  How	  do	  you	  use	  your	  opportunities?	  How	  do	  you	  generate	  a	  better	  life?”42	  
In	   the	   post-­‐‑war	   economic	   policy	   debate,	   almost	   everyone	   would	   eventually	   agree	   on	  deficit	  spending	  to	  fight	  unemployment,	  but	  some	  liberals	  went	  further	  than	  this	   fiscal	  consensus.	  They	  built	  on	  the	  emerging	  consensus	  of	  democratisation	  of	  living	  standards	  in	  the	  1950s.43	  Not	  willing	  to	  fully	  abdicate	  the	  collective	  power	  to	  share	  the	  wealth	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  elevate	  the	  nation,	  Musgrave,	  Colm,	  Hansen,	  and	  Heller,	  among	  others,	  advocated	  an	  increased	  national	  responsibility	  in	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  people,	  although	  this	  ran	   against	   the	   slowly	   growing	   policy	   trend	   for	   neutrality	   of	   the	   state	  with	   regard	   to	  consumption	  choices.	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	  Musgrave’s	   concept	  of	  merit	  wants,	   although	   it	  was	  rejected	   by	   many	   economists,	   conveyed	   ideas	   that	   were	   shared	   by	   some	   of	   his	  colleagues.	   Thus,	   Musgrave’s	   idea	   had	   a	   friendly	   audience	   in	   some	   policy	   circles.	   For	  instance,	  the	  Great	  Society	  was	  designed	  by	  those	  who	  have	  been	  receptive	  and	  shared	  Musgrave’s	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state.	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  Musgrave’s	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  was	  the	  spark	  which	  lit	  up	  the	  policy	  proposals	  of	  redistribution	  in	  kind,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42M.S.	  Handler,	  “27	  Specialists	  Start	  Flow	  of	  Ideas	  to	  White	  House”,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  3,	  1964.	  And	  ``What	  the	  future	  holds	  for	  America.	  As	  the	  President’s	  ‘Idea	  Men’	  See	  it.	  U.S.”	  News	  and	  World	  Report,	  June	  15,	  1964.	  Musgrave	  (1966)	  also	  defends	  the	  Great	  Society	  programs.	  On	  the	  imperative	  of	  sharing	  the	  wealth,	  see	  also	  Hansen	  (1957,	  146	  ff.).	  43For	  instance,	  Colm	  and	  Geiger	  (1958,	  58)	  argued	  that	  decent	  living	  standards	  for	  everyone	  was	  a	  shared	  value	  at	  the	  time.	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rather	  that	   it	   fitted	  the	  spirit	  of	  economic	   leadership	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	   fifties	  and	  early	  sixties.	  
Conclusion	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  although	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  was	  rejected	  by	  many	  young	  scholars	  trained	  in	  the	  New	  Welfare	  Economics,	  it	  was	  positively	  received	  by	   some	   liberal	   economists	   influential	   in	   policy	   circles	   (section	   3).	   Thus,	   Musgrave’s	  view	  in	  the	  1950s	  seems	  less	  out	  of	  touch	  than	  it	  might	  appear	  when	  we	  look	  at	  it	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  recent	  public	  economics.	  Yet,	   for	  Musgrave	  to	  give	  such	  a	  place	  to	  the	  concept,	  there	  must	  have	  been	  a	  prior	  intellectual	  background	  in	  place.	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  sketch	  relevant	  parts	  of	  this	  background	  (section	  2)	  which	  help	  to	  understand	  why	  he	  might	  have	  come	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  merit	  wants.	  This	  historical	  analysis	  of	  one	  concept	  of	   his	  Theory	   consolidates	   the	   view	   that	   it	   truly	   is	   a	   synthesis	   of	   different	   strands	   of	  thought	  (Sturn	  2010).	  
In	   the	   hot	   debate	   on	   the	   specificity	   of	   public	   expenditures,	   part	   of	   the	   considerations	  have	   found	   an	   incarnation	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   collective	   good,	   or	   that	   of	   social	   good	  (section	   1).	   Other	   ideas	   that	  were	   still	   flowing	   around	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century	  were	   left	   out	   of	   the	   new	  welfare	   methodological	   framework,	   namely	   other-­‐‑regarding	  motives	  which	   carry	  with	   them	   communal	   values	   (understood	   in	   a	   broad	   sense).	   For	  instance,	   the	   individuals,	  when	   acting	   in	   a	   democratic	   setting,	  might	  want	   to	  promote	  certain	   goods	   collectively	   to	   safeguard	   them	   from	   the	  market	   sphere.	   This	   conceptual	  transformation	   also	   reflects	   the	   broader	   evolution	   of	   public	   finance	   into	   public	  economics.	   From	   a	   comprehensive	   description	   of	   what	   the	   state	   was	   doing	   to	   a	  narrower	  consideration	  for	  efficiency	  restoring	  policies	  in	  cases	  of	  market	  failures.	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At	   the	  same	   time	  as	   the	  concept	  of	  public	  good	  was	  undergoing	  a	   semantic	   reduction,	  there	   was	   a	   growing	   enthusiasm	   in	   liberal	   circles	   for	   increased	   federal	   government	  responsibility	   in	   the	   welfare	   of	   the	   people.	   This	   policy	   agenda	   was	   fostered	   by	   the	  confidence	  in	  economic	  planning	  acquired	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  observation	   that,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   tremendous	   growth	   in	   wealth,	   a	   large	   share	   of	   the	  American	  people	  was	  still	  living	  in	  relatively	  poor	  conditions.	  This	  tension	  increased	  the	  need	   for	  a	  complementary	  concept	   to	  apprehend	  and	  to	  guide	  the	   fiscal	  activity	  of	   the	  state,	  and	  thus	  might	  explain	  why	  Musgrave	  coined	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants.	  
The	   history	   of	   ideas	   can	   benefit	   greatly	   from	   studying	   the	   failure	   of	   some	   strands	   of	  thought	   to	   reach	  mainstream	   economics.	   This	   paper	   was	   conceived	   as	   a	   step	   in	   that	  direction,	  by	  shedding	  light	  on	  a	  lurking	  concept	  in	  public	  economics.	  As	  Musgrave	  once	  put	  it:	  “the	  skeleton	  has	  remained	  in	  my	  closet	  and	  I	  am	  pleased	  to	  remain	  responsible	  for	  it”	  (Musgrave	  1983,	  91).	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